UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

7-30-2008

Idaho Counties Risk Management Underwriters v.
Northland Ins. Companies Respondent's Brief
Dckt. 34375

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"Idaho Counties Risk Management Underwriters v. Northland Ins. Companies Respondent's Brief Dckt. 34375" (2008). Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 1633.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/1633

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Supreme Court Docket No. 34375

IDAHO COUNTIES RISK
MANAGEMENT PROGRAM
UNDERWRITERS,

Ada County District
Case No. CVOC 0617112

Appellant,
:::· :!
~ :;

vs.

'

,·.,,....

[~80aJB .

NORTHLAND INSURANCE
COMPANIES,

Supremv.:;nufi _(.,ouit ~f ;\; :> ... :c
Eritereti or: 1'.TS bf
.

I

... ·-- /

--~--·

Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

-ooOooAPPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA,
HONORABLE DARLA WILLIAMSON, DISTRICT JUDGE, PRESIDING

Donald J. Farley
Bryan A. Nickels
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT &
BLANTON, P.A.
702 West Idaho, Suite 700
Post Office Box 1271
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 395-8500
Attorneys for Respondent

Phillip J. Collaer
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL, LLP
C.W, Moore Plaza
th
250 S. 5 Street, Ste. 700
P.O. Box 7426
Boise, ID 83707-7426
Telephone: (208) 344-5800
Attorneys for Appellant

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ........................................................................................... 4
A.
B.
C.

Nature of Case ......................................................................................................... 4
Course of Proceedings ............................................................................................ 4
Concise Statement of the Facts............................................................................... 4

II.

ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL ..................................................... 21

Ill.

ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL. ................................................................................... 21

IV.

ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................... 21
A.

B.
C.

D.
E.
V.

ICRMP's Decision To Defend The Kootenai County Defendants Under Its Own
Policy Does Not Trigger Coverage Under The Northfield Policy When No
Coverage For The Occurrence Exists Under the Northfield Policy..................... 21
The Northfield Policy Is Not Reinsurance And Coverage-And Coverage Under
It Must First Exist For ICRMP To Be Entitled To Reimbursement. .................... 23
ICRMP's Election to Defend Does Not Impact the District Court's Analysis of the
Existence of Coverage under the Northfield Policy. The District Court Properly
Analyzed Whether There Was An Occurrence During the Northfield Policy
Period .................................................................................................................... 29
The Allegations in the Paradis Complaint Do Not Implicate Coverage Under the
Northfield Policy ................................................................................................... 33
Northland Has the Right to Contest Coverage of!CRMP's Settlement with
Mr. Paradis ............................................................................................................ 45

CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 47

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases
ACandS, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 764 F.2d 968 (3d Cir.1985) ....................................... 43
Aetna Casualty and Surety Company v. Home Ins. Co., 882 F. Supp. 1328 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) .... 24
Afcan v. Mutual Fire, Marine and Inland Ins. Co., 595 P.2d 638,647 (1979) ............................. 46
All City Ins. Co. v. Sioukas, 378 N.Y.S.2d 711 (N. Y. A.O. 1976) .............................................. 23
Anderton v. Herrington, 741 P.2d 360 (Ct. App. 1987) ............................................................... 35
Appalachian Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 676 F.2d 56 (3rd Cir. 1982) ................... 31, 32, 43
Appalachian Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Corp., 507 F. Supp. 59 (W.D. Pa. 1981), affd
676 F .2d 56 (3 rd Cir. 1982) ....................................................................................................... 32
Bigansky v. Thomas Jefferson University Hosp., 442 Pa.Super. 69, 658 A.2d 423 (1995) ......... 43
Brady v. Maryland, 3 73 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (l 963) ...................................... 9
Cascade Auto Glass, Inc. v. Idaho Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 141 Idaho 660, 115 P.3d 751
(2005) ........................................................................................................................................ 29
City of Erie, Pennsylvania v. Guaranty Nat. Ins. Co., 109 F.2d 156,161-62 (3 rd Cir. 1997)........ 43
City ofldaho Falls v. Home Indemnity Co., 126 Idaho 604,888 P.2d 383 (1995) ................ 45, 46
Commercial Union Assurance Co. v. Zurich American Ins. Co., 471 F.Supp. 1011
(S.D.Ata.1979) .......................................................................................................................... 43
Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Swiss Reinsurance America, 413 F.3d 121 (1st Cir. 2005) ......... 25
Deluna v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 2008 WL 2586497 (Idaho, July 1, 2008) .............. 45
Dioceses of Winona v. Interstate Fire & Casualty Co., 89 F.3d 1386 (8th Cir. 1996) ........... 43, 44
Empire Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. North Pacific Ins. Co., 127 Idaho 716, 95 P.2d 1025
(!995) ........................................................................................................................................ 44
Exterovich v. City of Kellogg, 139 Idaho 439, 80 P.3d 1040 (2003) ........................................... 22
Insurance Co. ofNorth America v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212 (6th
Cir.1980) ................................................................................................................................... 43
Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 667 F .2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ............... 40, 43
Kootenai County v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 113 Idaho 908, 750 P.2d 87 (1988) .................... 31
Medical Center, 670 F. Supp. 393 (D.D.C. 1987) ........................................................................ 23
Michigan Milters Mut. Ins. Co. v. North American Reinsurance Corp., 452 N.W.2d 841
(Mich. App. 1990) ..................................................................................................................... 25
Michigan Tp. Participating Plan v. Federal Ins. Co., 592 N.W.2d 760 (Mich. App. 1999) ......... 25
Muller Fuel Oil Co. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 232 A.2d 168 (NJ. Super. 1967) ........ 37
National Aviation Underwriters, Inc. v. Idaho Aviation Center, 96 Idaho 663,471 P.2d 55
(l970) ........................................................................................................................................ 37
Nat'! Cas. Ins. Co. v. City of Mt. Vernon, 515 N.Y.S.2d 267 (1987) ........................................... 41
North River Ins. Co. v. Broward County Sheriffs Office, 428 F. Supp. 2d 1284 (S.D. Fla.
2006) ··································································································································· 41, 42

11

North River Ins. Co. v. Cigna Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d 1194 (3rd Cir. 1995) ..................... 24, 25
Northfield Ins. Co. v. Montana Ass'n of Counties, 10 P.3d 813 (Mont. 2000) ............................ 24
Paradis v. Arave, 130 F.3d 385 (9th Cir. 1997) ...................................................................... 7, 8, 9
Paradis v. Arave, 2000 WL 307458 (D. Idaho 2000), affd by Paradis v. Arave, 240 F.3d
1169 (9th Cir. 2001) ............................................................................................ 9, 10, 12, 14, 15
Paradis v. Arave, 667 F. Supp. 1361 (D. Idaho 1987), aff'd in part, rev 'din part by 954
F.2d 1483 (9th Cir. 1992), ajf'd on remand by 20 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
513 U.S. 1117, 115 S. Ct. 915,130 L.Ed.2d 796(1995) ............................................................ 8
Paradis v. State, 110 Idaho 534, 716 P.2d 1306 (1986) .................................................................. 8
Public Entity Multi-Lines Insurance Policy, Policy No. I 9A0102810010015, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21
Purvis v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 142 Idaho 213, _ , 127 P.3d 116 (2005) ........................... 26
S. Freedman & Sons v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 396 A.2d 195 (D.C.1978) ................................... 43
Southern Maryland Agric. Ass'n v. Bituminous Cas. Corp., 539 F.Supp. 1295 (D.Md.1982) .... 43
State v. Paradis, 106 Idaho 117,676 P.2d 31 (1983) ...................................................................... 8
Stonewall Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Co. ofldaho, 132 Idaho 318,971 P.2d
1142 (l 998) ............................................................................................................................... 44
Rules
l.A.R. l2(b)(3) ................................................................................................................................ 4
l.A.R. 40 .................................................................................................................................. 21, 22
Other Authorities
19 Couch, Insurance, 2d, § 80.66, pp. 673-674 ............................................................................ 25
Denver Univ. L.R. 29 .................................................................................................................... 23

iii

I. ST ATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of Case.

Appellant Idaho Counties Risk Management Program Underwriters ("ICRMP") does not
provide a summary of the nature of the case; accordingly, appellant Northland Insurance
Companies

(whose

proper

name

and

identity

herein

is

Northfield

Insurance

Company)(hereinafter "Northfield") provides such in accord with I.A.R. l 2(b)(3).
This case involves a claim by ICRMP against a reimbursement insurance policy issued to
it by Northfield for coverage for the defense and settlement of a civil rights action filed by
Donald Paradis against Kootenai County and its agents arising from the alleged wrongful
incarceration of Mr. Paradis for murder some 26+ years ago. ICRMP defended and settled Mr.
Paradis' suit under the policy it issued to Kootenai County, and, in turn, made claim against the
Northfield policy. Northfield denied coverage on various grounds, including that the claim did
not arise from an occurrence which took place during the applicable period of the Northfield
policy, that Northfield's policy does not cover the defense costs incurred by ICRMP, and that the
claims settled by ICRMP do not implicate coverage under the Northfield policy. Northfield
prevailed on summary judgment.
B.

Course of Proceedings.

Northfield agrees with ICRMP's summary of the course of proceedings in this matter.
C.

Concise Statement of the Facts.

ICRMP' s statement of facts do not fully and adequately state the facts established by the
District Court nor the facts presented by Northfield, both of which are presented in this
supplemental statement of facts.
In granting summary judgment to Northfield, the Court found the following facts:
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This case arises out of an insurance coverage dispute. The central controversy
arises from a lawsuit filed in Federal Court by Donald M. Paradis against various
Idaho Counties Risk Management Program Underwriters ("ICRMP") insureds,
including Kootenai County, and other individuals. During the relevant periods,
ICRMP purchased what it is calling reinsurance from Defendant Northland 1
("Northland"). ICRMP defended its insureds in the Paradis lawsuit under a
reservation of rights. Northland has denied coverage, taking the position that the
Northland policy does not cover the occurrence in question.
ICRMP was created in 1985 and sold insurance to its member insureds.
During that period ICRMP purchased what it describes as "reinsurance"2 from
Northland. 3 In 2003, Donald Paradis filed a complaint in the Federal District
Court for the District of Idaho alleging, inter alia, false arrest, false imprisonment,
detention, and negligence, all of which were alleged violations of his federally
protected civil rights and state law. Following the filing of the Paradis
Complaint, Kootenai County forwarded the Complaint to ICRMP for its review
and determination on a duty to defend. Upon review of the Complaint, ICRMP
determined that based on the facts and legal theories alleged there was a legal
duty to defend on the claims of negligent and intentional inflictions of emotional
distress and failure to train. The duty to defend was held with a reservation of
rights which was forwarded to Northland.
After ICRMP undertook the defense of the Paradis litigation, motions to
dismiss were filed and granted in part in that case. The Court therein declined,
however, to dismiss the constitutional claims and the state law claims which were
based upon continuing torts. Soon thereafter, Mr. Paradis filed an amended
complaint clarifying the legal theories and factual allegations against ICRMP
insureds. ICRMP's determination that it had a duty to defend did not change. 4

1

Northland Insurance Company is also identified as Northfield Insurance
Company. For purposes of this motion, the Court will use Northland to reference
both in keeping with the symmetry of the pleading caption.
2

ICRMP describes the supplemental insurance as reinsurance while Northland
would characterize the insurance policy as reimbursement insurance.

3

ICRMP argues that this insurance was purchased from its inception while
Northland argues that company records indicate that policies were issued to
ICRMP for 1986-1988 and 1994-2001.
4

ICRMP found that a duty to defend resulted only on three of the surviving
claims, Count I (§ 1983: Failure to Train re: Brady) against Kootenai County;
Count X(l) (Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress) against Haws; and Count
X(2) (Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress) against Haws. These are the
only Counts considered by the Court.
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(R. 191-92.) However, given the complexity of the underlying matter and allegations relevant
thereto, Northfield identifies the following as facts salient to the matter at hand:
The Palmer murder and Paradis criminal action.

1.

On June 22, 1980, the bodies of Kimberly Palmer and Scott Currier were found in

the woods outside of Post Falls, Idaho. (R. 220, Exh. 11, Counsel Aff., Exh. A, 14; Exh. B, p.19.)
2.

Following retrieval by Kootenai County law enforcement authorities, Mr. Currier

and Ms. Palmer's bodies were transported to Portland, Oregon, for autopsy that same day, and
autopsies were performed on June 23, 1980 by the Chief Medical Examiner for the State of
Oregon, William Brady, M.D. The autopsies were also observed by detective George Elliott of
the Kootenai County Sheriff's Department (Id at Exh. A, ,is & 10; Exh. B, p. 19.)
3.

The following day, June 24, 1980, a meeting was held among a number of

individuals from the Spokane County Sheriff's Office and the Kootenai County Sheriff's Office
to discuss the investigation of the killings. Also in attendance was Kootenai County Deputy
Prosecuting Attorney D. Marc Haws. (Id 110 & 11; Exh. B, p. 20.) At the time, the Prosecuting
Attorney for the county of Kootenai was Glen Walker. (Id at ill.)

During the course of the

meeting, Mr. Haws took notes which reflected his understanding of the murders of Mr. Currier
and Ms. Palmer at that time, as well as some of the discussions had among the individuals
attending the meeting ("the Haws notes"). (Id. at ,i12; Exh. B, p.20; Exh. DD, ll. 60:6-64: 1.)
4.

Also on June 24, 1980, Paradis and two other individuals, Tom Gibson and a Mr.

Amacher, were charged with the murder of Currier and Palmer in Washington, and Paradis was
arrested and taken into custody in Washington. (Id., Exh. B, p. 21.) At some time thereafter,
Washington and Idaho prosecutors agreed that Currier's murder would first be tried in
Washington, and no action would be taken in trying the Palmer murder. (Id; Exh. HH, IL
254: 17-256:9.)
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5.

Thereafter, on June 25, 1980, Mr. Haws represented the State at a probable cause

hearing, seeking first degree murder charges against Donald Paradis, Tom Gibson and Larry
Evans for the murder of Kimberly Palmer in Idaho. (Id., Exh. A, at 120; Exh. B, p.21.) At this
hearing, Mr. Elliott provided testimony regarding the investigation, having previously executed
the affidavit in support of the complaints for the arrest warrants for Paradis, Gibson, and Evans.
(Id. Exh. A, 12; Exh. B, p. 21.)

6.

In September 1980, Mr. Paradis was tried (jointly with Mr. Gibson) and acquitted

of the murder of Mr. Currier in Washington; Mr. Haws attended this trial. (Id., Exh. B, p. 22;
Exh. HH, ll. 257:2-11.) After the acquittal, Kootenai County sought arrest warrants for Mr.
Paradis (as well as Mr. Gibson) for the murder of Ms. Palmer. (Id., Exh. B, p. 22.)
7.

On November 26, 1980, Mr. Paradis was arrested and made his initial appearance

in an Idaho court on the charge of murder of Kimberly Palmer. (Id., Exh. B, p. 22; Exh. HH, II.
227:7-l 0.)
8.

On December 8-12, I 980, Mr. Paradis' preliminary hearing was conducted by

Kootenai County Deputy Prosecuting Attorney Peter Erbland. (Id., Exh. A, §31; Exh. B, p. 22.)
9.

In April 1981, a bail hearing was conducted for Mr. Paradis, wherein a 'aspiration

of water' theory was first presented by the State. (Id., Exh. B, p. 22.) Specifically, Dr. Brady
had previously opined in June or July of 1980 to Haws (who possibly conveyed that information
to Elliott and Erbland) that Ms. Palmer had aspirated water from the creek near Post Falls in
which her body had been found partially submerged, suggesting that she had been alive when she
went into the creek and, consequently, was killed in Idaho. (Id. at p. 21 ); Paradis v. Arave, 130
F.3d 385, 392 (9th Cir. 1997). The Ninth Circuit noted in commenting on the theory:
The location of Palmer's death was crucial in more than one respect. The theory of
Paradis' defense was that Currier and Palmer were both killed by others at Paradis'
house in Spokane at a time when Paradis was not present. Indeed, Paradis had
been tried and acquitted in Washington for the murder of Currier. If Palmer was
RESPONDENT'S BRJEF- 7

killed at the creek in Idaho, however, then Paradis was almost certainly involved
in her murder rather than merely in the disposal of her body. Location of the
murder in Idaho was also essential to the Idaho court's jurisdiction.
130 F.3d at 392.

IO.

On December IO, 1981, following trial conducted by Mr. Haws and Mr. Erbland,

as the Kootenai County lead prosecutors on the case, Donald Paradis was found guilty of firstdegree murder in Idaho, and was sentenced to death. (Id., Exh. A, §31; Exh. B, p. 23, 50, 63);
Paradis v. State, I IO Idaho 534, 716 P.2d 1306 (1986). During the trial, Dr. Brady testified that
Ms. Palmer had inhaled water at the Idaho crime scene. (Id., Exh. B, at p. 23.)
11.

Mr. Walker left office as Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney in 1988. (R.

220, Exh. 11, Counsel Aff., Exh. EE, at II. 56:5-24.)
12.

Mr. Haws left the employment of Kootenai County in 1983. (Id., Exh. DD, at II.

121 :5-7.)
13.

Mr. Erbland left the employment of Kootenai County in 1987. (Id., Exh. FF, at II.

10:6-8.)
14.

Mr. Elliott retired in 1988. (Id., Exh. GG, at II. 8:8-13.)

15.

Mr. Paradis subsequently sought review of his conviction by appeal, post-

conviction relief, and habeas corpus in Idaho state court and the United States District Court for
the District of Idaho; these various petitions were denied. See State v. Paradis, 106 Idaho 117,
676 P.2d 31 (1983); Paradis v. State, 110 Idaho 534,716 P.2d 1306 (1986); Paradis v. Arave,
667 F. Supp. 1361 (D. Idaho 1987), ajf'd in part, rev'd in part by 954 F.2d 1483 (9th Cir. 1992),
ajf'd on remand by 20 F.3d 950 (9tl1 Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1117, 115 S. Ct. 915, 130
L.Ed.2d 796 (l 995).
16.

Mr. Paradis again sought habeas relief in 1995. While this habeas petition was

pending in January 1996, Paradis' counsel obtained for the first time copies of the Haws notes
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from the attorney representing Tom Gibson. Gibson's attorney had obtained the notes through
subpoenas of Kootenai County during Gibson's post conviction relief efforts. Paradis v. Arave,
130 F.3d at 393-4. The Haws notes, in substance, showed significant inconsistencies in Dr.
Brady's opinion the day after the autopsy as to the cause and location of death, and Dr. Brady's
opinions at trial. Id. at 394-5. While Paradis was awaiting trial in Kootenai County in 1980-81,
Paradis' attorney had made a routine request for disclosure pursuant to !CR 16, but the
prosecutor did not reveal the notes or any of the potentially exculpatory information in or related
to them.

Id at 394. In 1987, Paradis had also sought a subpoena of documents from the

Kootenai County Prosecutor's office during the course of his first federal habeas petition, but the
subpoena was quashed. Id. The Ninth Circuit examined the significance of the Haws notes and
the exculpatory evidence to Paradis' criminal trial, and held that a violation of Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), requiring the Kootenai County
prosecutors to disclose exculpatory evidence, more likely than not occurred prior to Paradis' trial
for the murder in Idaho of Kimberly Palmer. Id at 395. The Ninth Circuit remanded Paradis'
habeas corpus proceeding to the district court for a further evidentiary hearing. Id at 400.
I 7.

On May 17, 1996, Mr. Paradis was granted clemency by the Governor of Idaho,

who commuted his sentence to life without parole. Paradis v. Arave, 130 F.3d 385, 389 (9tl' Cir.
1997).
18.

On remand from the Ninth Circuit, the district court granted the habeas petition on

March 14, 2000, and ordered the State, within 120 days, to initiate new trial proceedings against
Mr. Paradis or release him, which ruling was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit on March 5, 2001.
Paradis v. Arave, 2000 WL 307458 (D. Idaho 2000), ajf'd by Paradis v. Arave, 240 F.3d I 169
(9 th Cir. 200 I).
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19.

Mr. Paradis pied to a lesser charge of accessory to a felony, and was released on

April 10, 2001. (R. 220, Exh. 11, Counsel Aff., Exh. C, at Exhibit D; Exh. HH, 11. 319:20-24.)
The Paradis lawsuit against Kootenai County, et al.

20.

Following Mr. Paradis' release from custody, he filed a Notice of Tort Claim with

Kootenai County on October 9, 2001. (Id., Exh. D, at ifl7.)
21.

On April 9, 2003, Mr. Paradis filed his Complaint in the U.S. District Court for

the District of Idaho, naming William Brady, Kootenai County, Glen Walker, D. Marc Haws,
Peter Erbland, and George Elliott as defendants. (Id., Exh. E.) Plaintiffs initial Complaint
included several claims predicated on the withholding of evidence by the defendants:
•

Under Count One, Mr. Paradis asserted civil rights claims under the Fourth, Sixth,
and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, and a violation of the Idaho
Constitution, against defendants Kootenai County and Walker, for failing to train
and supervise with respect to Brady requirements. Specifically, Mr. Paradis
alleged that "[b]y 1980 and 1981," the law governing Brady had been clearly
established (if62); and that "[a]t the times of the Currier and Palmer homicide
investigations, Plaintiffs arrest, and continuing through the prosecution of
Paradis without interruption," Kootenai County and Walker knew or should have
known that their employees would be faced with circumstances requiring Brady
disclosures, thereby necessitating specific training on that point (1164 & 69).

•

Under Count Two, Mr. Paradis asserted civil rights claims under the Fourth,
Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, and a violation of the
Idaho Constitution, against defendants Kootenai County and Walker, for failing to
train and supervise with respect to prosecutions lacking probable cause.
Specifically, Mr. Paradis alleged that "[a]t the time Paradis was arrested and
charged by Kootenai County," he had a clearly established right to not be arrested
and prosecuted without probable cause (iJ73), and that "[i]n 1980 and 1981,"
Kootenai County and Walker knew or should have known that their employees
would be faced with cases where probable cause was lacking, thereby
necessitating specific training on that point (if74);

•

Under Counts Four, Five and Six, Mr. Paradis asserted claims for negligence,
false arrest, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, and violations of Idaho
criminal statutes, against defendants Walker, Haws, Erbland, and Elliott.
Specifically, Mr. Paradis alleged three primary arguments: first, with respect to
the arrest warrant obtained in 1980 (if41), that "[a]lthough warrants were sought
and obtained by these Defendants for the arrest, detention, restraint and
incarceration of Paradis," such warrants were "obtained by deceit, through the
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intentional, deliberate and malicious withholding of material, exculpatory
evidence . . . and through the presentation of infonnation which was either
knowingly false or fraught with a reckless disregard for the truth and accuracy of
such information" (i!83); second, with respect to the December 1980 preliminary
hearing and related pre-trial motion to dismiss (4!J43), that "[a]t the time of the
Plaintiff's preliminary hearing, and subsequently at the Idaho district court
judge's reconsideration of the magistrate's probable cause determination on
Plaintifr s motion to dismiss, there was a further intentional, deliberate and
malicious withholding of material evidence by these Defendants and a
representation of information and arguments ostensibly supporting probable cause
which was completely without factual support'' (,r84); and third, with respect to
the December 1981 trial (,r,r54 & 57), that "[i]n prosecuting the first degree
murder charge against Paradis, Haws intentionally concealed or recklessly
withheld evidence which was exculpatory and impeaching and either suborned the
perjurous testimony of Dr. Brady or deliberately elected not to report such perjury
to the Court when it obviously occurred." (if85).
•

Under Count Six, Mr. Paradis asserted civil rights claims under the Fourth, Sixth,
and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, and a violation of the Idaho
Constitution, against defendants Haws, Elliott, and Brady, for conspiracy to
present the aspirated-water argument Specifically, Mr. Paradis alleged that prior
to his November 1980 arrest, with respect to defendants Haws and Elliott,
"[w]hen this conspiracy arose and was first acted upon, Haws and Elliott were
performing purely investigatory functions which preceded the arrest and decision
to prosecute Paradis" (,r92), and that Dr. Brady then adopted this conspiracy "into
his ostensibly informed opinion testimony for purpose of the Gibson and Paradis
trials" in June and December 1981 (ff47, 54, & 91);

•

Under Count Seven, Mr. Paradis asserted negligent and intentional infliction of
emotional distress claims against Dr. Brady in his capacity as a private citizen for
"committing the conduct alleged in Count Six,'~ relating to Dr. Brady's testimony
in the Gibson and Paradis trials in June and December 1981 (1147, 54, 91, & 98);

•

Under CoWlt Eight, Mr. Paradis asserted a defamation claim against Dr. Brady for
statements related to the subjects of his testimony "[t]hroughout the numerous and
various challenges to Plaintifr s conviction" (1103 ); and

•

Under Counts Nine, Ten and Eleven, Mr. Paradis asserted claims of negligence,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and defamation against defendant
Haws, on two points: first, that, at the time of Paradis 1986 habeas
proceedings(1112), when "Haws was living in Salt Lake City, Utah [and] no
longer employed as a prosecutor and was working for a private company" (,rl 13),
he reviewed his prior file notes and continued to withhold them, making "a
negligent, if not deliberate choice, of continued secrecy. . . inflicting severe
emotional distress upon Paradis" (1118); and second, that "[t]hroughout his
involvement in the Paradis and Gibson cases, both when serving as a prosecutor
and after" (ifl20), Haws defamed Paradis in the media (1fi!121-122).
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(Id, Exh. E, at pp. 14-28; Exh. F, at pp. 4-6.)
22.

Thereafter, the Paradis defendants filed a number of motions to dismiss, and on

September 30, 2004, the court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order, dismissing a number
of the claims made by Paradis, and permitting the filing of an amended complaint. (Id., Exh. F,
at pp. 77-80.)
23.

On June 6, 2005, Mr. Paradis filed his First Amended Complaint and Demand for

Jury Trial, which continued to identify William Brady, Kootenai County, Glen Walker, D. Marc

Haws, Peter Erbland, and George Elliott as defendants.

(Id, Exh. D.) Mr. Paradis refined his

claims, which were made as follows:
•

Under Count I, Mr. Paradis alleged a claim under §1983 for failure to train re:
Brady requirements against defendants Kootenai County and Walker.
Specifically, Mr. Paradis alleged that "[b]y 1980 and 1981," the law governing
Brady had been clearly established (i/91), such that by November 1980, "[a]t the
time of Plaintiffs arrest, and continuing thereafter without interruption",
Kootenai County and Walker knew or should have known that their employees
would be faced with circumstances requiring Brady disclosures, thereby
necessitating specific training on that point (i!i/91-95).

•

Under Count II, Mr. Paradis alleged a claim under § 1983 for failure to train re:
probable cause against defendants Kootenai County and Walker. Specifically,
Mr. Paradis alleged that "[a]t the time Plaintiff-Paradis was arrested and charged
by Kootenai County," he had a clearly established right to not be arrested and
prosecuted without probable cause (,ll02), such that "[i]n 1980 and 1981,"
Kootenai County and Walker knew or should have known that their employees
would be faced with cases where probable cause in potential cases was lacking,
thereby necessitating specific training on that point (,i,103 & 105);

•

Under Count III, Mr. Paradis alleged a claim under §1983 for failure to train re:
fabricated evidence against defendants Kootenai County and Walker.
Specifically, Mr. Paradis alleged that "[a]t the time Plaintiff-Paradis was arrested
and charged by Kootenai County," he had a clearly established right to not be
seized, arrested or prosecuted through the use of fabricated evidence (1112), such
that "[i]n 1980 and 1981," Kootenai County and Walker knew or should have
known that their employees might use fabricated evidence, thereby necessitating
specific training on that point (i/1113-115, & 118).
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•

Under Count IV, Mr. Paradis alleged a claim under §1983 for malicious
prosecution against defendants Brady and Elliott, asserting that "[t]he named
Defendants wrongfully caused the charges against Plaintiff-Paradis to be filed and
wrongfully prosecutedt noting that "[t]he proceeding for the first degree murder
of Kimberly Palmer against Plaintiff-Paradis was subsequently terminated in his
favor some 20 years later." (,I,Il23-124).

•

Under Count V, Mr. Paradis alleged a claim under § 1983 for pre-arrest conspiracy
to fabricate jurisdiction and probable cause against all defendants. Specifically,
Mr. Paradis alleged that, in reference to his November 26, 1980 arrest (if59),
"[p ]re-arrest, knowing they did not possess, and could not lawfully obtain,
evidence which provided proof beyond a reasonable doubt . . . the Defendants
entered into a plan, design and conspiracy to concoct evidence against PlaintiffParadis as if fact[.]" (if 134). Further, Mr. Paradis alleged that Dr. Brady "then
transposed the theory into his ostensibly informed opinion testimony for purpose
for the Gibson and Plaintiff-Paradis trials" in June and December 1981 (ifif71, 81
& 135), and, following Mr. Paradis' conviction, continued to conspire with other
unidentified individuals (ifl 42).

•

Under Count VI, Mr. Paradis alleged a claim under §1983 for false procurement
of an arrest warrant against defendant Elliott. Specifically, Mr. Paradis alleged
that Elliott, in seeking the arrest warrant for Paradis' November 26, 1980 arrest,
"obtained by deceit, through the intentional, deliberate and malicious withholding
of material, exculpatory evidence ... and through the presentation of information
by him which was either knowingly false or fraught with a reckless disregard for
the truth and accuracy of such information" (iJ146), and also that, with respect to
the December 1980 preliminary hearing and related pre-trial motion to dismiss
(166), that "[a]t the time of the Plaintiffs preliminary hearing, and subsequently
at the Idaho district court judge's reconsideration of the magistrate's probable
cause determination on Plaintiffs motion to dismiss, there was a further
intentional, deliberate and malicious withholding of material evidence by Elliott
and a representation of information and arguments ostensibly supporting probable
cause which was completely without factual support" (1147).

•

Under Count VII, Mr. Paradis alleged a state law claim for negligent training and
supervision against defendants Kootenai County and Walker, particularly
incorporating "the allegations of Counts I, II and III", to assert that "[i]n the
investigatory stages of the Palmer homicide, prior to the arrest of Plaintiff-Paradis
and then continuing thereafter, Defendants-Walker and Kootenai County failed
and neglected to reasonably supervise and exercise control over Haws, Erbland,
Elliott and Brady" (if I 56).

•

Under Count VIII, Mr. Paradis alleged a state law claim for intentional infliction
of emotional distress against defendant Brady, for conduct beginning with the
investigatory phase of the case through Mr. Paradis' later release in April 2001
(1160).
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•

Under Count IX, Mr. Paradis alleged a state law claim for false light invasion of
privacy against defendants Brady and Haws, for statements related to the
aspirated-water theory. As to Brady, Mr. Paradis alleged that Brady made
statements "after the conviction of Plaintiff-Paradis, up to and including the time
of his release upon habeas corpus" (1171 ). With Haws, Paradis clarified that,
with respect to Haws, "[t]he statements included, but were not limited to Haws'
statements to the media after he was no longer a prosecutor to the effect that
Plaintiff-Paradis was guilty of murdering Palmer," such that "[t]hese statements
by Haws took place on or about 1986 and 1987 and continued after PlaintiffParadis' release from prison." (,r,rI 73-174).

•

Under Count X, Mr. Paradis alleged a state law claim for negligent and intentional
infliction of emotional distress against defendant Haws, based upon Haws'
alleged statements regarding Paradis' guilt. While alleging that Haws made these
statements "[d]uring the investigatory phase and after the conviction," (i!182),
Paradis further alleged that, for acts occurring in the time period after his
December 1981 conviction, "[d]uring the extensive post-conviction and habeas
corpus proceedings involving Plaintiff-Paradis, Defendant Haws was a private
citizen, that is, he was not a state actor." (i!l 87). Similarly, referring to Haws'
alleged continued withholding of his notes following the subpoena issued in 1986
or 1987 for the habeas proceeding, Paradis alleged that Haws was "then a private
attorney practicing in Salt Lake City, Utah(.J" (i!i!l 93-194).

•

Under Count XI, Mr. Paradis alleged a claim under § 1983 for conspiracy to
withhold exculpatory evidence against defendants Elliott and Brady. Specifically,
Mr. Paradis alleged that, in the time before his December 1981 trial, "Brady and
Elliott conspired that Brady would not bring documents and tangible evidence to,
or reveal documents and tangible evidence at, the trial of Plaintiff-Paradis, that
would show that he was innocent of the crime with which he was charged."
(i!200).

(Id, Exh. B, at pp. 4-5; Exh. D, at pp. 17-41.)
24.

Following another round of motions to dismiss, the Paradis court issued its

Memorandum Order on March 31, 2006, dismissing a number of claims, as well as dismissing
defendants Walker, Erbland, and Brady, thereby only leaving the following claims at issue in the
litigation:
•

Count I, Count II, Count III, and Count VII (the failure to train claims, supra,
relating to the status of the law "[i]n 1980 and 1981" (i!i!91, 103, & 113) and the
alleged failure to train county employees of such law "(a]t the time PlaintiffParadis was arrested and charged by Kootenai County" (,t,r93, 102, & 112))
against defendant Kootenai County, which were not addressed in the court's
Memorandum Order;

RESPONDENT'S BRJEF- 14

•

Count V against defendant Haws, §1983 conspiracy regarding the aspiration of
water theory for the time period of late June or early July, 1980, and continuing
through December 10, 1980;

•

Count V against defendant Elliott, § 1983 conspiracy regarding the aspiration of
water theory for the time period of late June or early July, 1980, and continuing
through December 10, 1980;

•

Count X( I) against defendant Haws, negligent infliction of emotional distress
claim for the time period oflate June or early July, 1980, and continuing through
December 10, 1980; and

•

Count X(2) against defendant Haws, intentional infliction of emotional distress
for the time period of late June or early July, 1980, and continuing through
December 10, 1980.

(Id., Exh. B, at pp. 5, 66.)
25.

Thereafter, defendants Kootenai County, Haws and Elliott, through ICRMP as the

insurer, agreed to settle the remaining claims of Paradis against them for $900,000, and a
stipulation to dismiss was filed August 14, 2006. (Id., Exhs. G & H.)
The ICRMP and Northfield Policies, and ICRMP 's Complaint.

26.

ICRMP was formed in 1985, and Kootenai County is a member thereof. (R. 8-9,

Complaint at ,r,rvr & VIL)
27.

During the course of that membership, but beginning in 1985, ICRMP issued to

Kootenai County a number of insurance policies over the years, including a Public Entity MultiLines Insurance Policy, Policy No. 19A01028100100, with a policy period from October 1, 2000
to October 1, 2001 ("the ICRMP Policy"). (R. 220, Exh. 11, Counsel Aff., Exh. I.) This policy
provided both Comprehensive General Liability coverage, as well as Errors & Omissions
coverage . Id
28.

After Mr. Paradis filed his notice of tort claim against Kootenai County on

October 9, 2001, the claim was forwarded to ICRMP. (Id, Exh. J.)
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29.

Thereafter, following review of the claim under the ICRMP Policy, ICRMP

denied the claim on November 20, 2001.

(Id., Exh. K.)

In denying coverage, ICRMP's

representative noted:
The date of loss for this claim is June 24, 1980 (the date that Deputy Prosecutor Hawes
learned of the exculpatory evidence and did not turn it over to Paradis' s attorneys).
This date could be stretched to the date of Paradis's conviction on the murder charge,
which would have occurred in 1981, but that would still be well outside the retroactive
date of the Policy.
Id. at 1. 1

30.

ICRMP later indicated to Kootenai County, on November 18, 2002, that it would

reconsider the claim when Paradis filed a complaint. (Id., Exh. L.)
31.

Following the filing of the Paradis complaint on April 9, 2003, ICRMP accepted

the defense under a reservation of rights as to defendants Kootenai County, Walker, Haws,
Elliott, and Erbland by way of letter dated June 30, 2003. Defense was denied to defendant
Brady, by way of letter dated June 12, 2003. 2 (R. 220, Exh. 9, Martens Aff., Exhs. B & C.)
32.

In December 2005, following the filing of Paradis' First Amended Complaint,

ICRMP advised the defendants that ICRMP would continue to provide a defense. (R. 220, Exh.
11, Counsel Aff., Exhs. M-Q.)
33.

On December 29, 2005, a letter from Ms. McHenry directed to Kootenai County

reflected that ICRMP considered only three of the claims in the First Amended Complaint to be
covered: Count I ((§1983/Failure to Train re: Brady) against Kootenai County; Count X(l)
(Negligent Infliction) against Haws; and Count X(2) (Intentional Infliction) against Haws. 3 (Id.,

1

Although Northfield's 2000-2001 policy is at issue, note that this initial denial references
ICRMP's policy "effective October 1, 2001," rather than ICRMP's 2000-2001 policy.
2
Again, although Northfield's 2000-2001 policy is at issue, note that the denial of coverage to
defendant Brady references ICRMP's policy "effective October 1, 2002," rather than ICRMP's
2000-2001 policy.
3
Paradis' First Amended Complaint only contains a Count X; however, for the district court's
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Exh. R.) The remainder of the claims in the First Amended Complaint "appear not to be covered
by the ICRMP policy since the date of loss appears to be outside the County's policy periods."
Id The letter went on to state that "the County's prior carriers should be put on notice. As I

understand from your conversation, those carriers, to your knowledge, have been put on notice,
and you will provide that information to us as soon as possible." Id
34.

Northfield issued to ICRMP a Public Entity All Lines Aggregate Insurance

Policy, Policy No. AA101263, policy period October 1, 2000 to October 2001 ("the Northfield
Policy").

(R. 220, Exh. 9, Martens Aff., Exh. A.)

This policy provided occurrence-based

comprehensive general liability coverage (Section II), and claims-made errors & omissions
coverage (Section IV), both of which in general obligated Northfield to indemnify ICRMP for
loss and expenses incurred by ICRMP on claims covered by the Northfield Policy.

Id.

(Emphasis supplied.) Section II of the Northfield Policy provides two coverage components at
issue in this litigation:
A - COMPREHENSIVE GENERAL LIABILITY: Underwriters hereby agree,
subject to the limitations, terms and conditions hereunder mentioned, to
indemnify the Assured for all sums, including expenses, all as more fully defined
by the terms ultimate net loss, which the Assured shall become legally obligated
to pay as damages imposed by law because of bodily injury, property damage,
personal injury, advertising injury, products liability and or completed operations,
host/liquor liability or incidental malpractice which result from an occurrence and
which occur during the policy period.

C - LAW ENFORCEMENT LIABILITY: Underwriters hereby agree, subject to
the limitations, terms and conditions hereunder mentioned, to indemnify the
Assured for all sums which the Assured shall be obligated to pay by reason of
errors, omissions or negligent acts arising out of the performance of the Assured's
duties while acting as a law enforcement official or officer in the regular course of
public employment as hereinafter defined, arising out of any occurrence from any
cause on account of Personal Injury, Bodily Injury, Property Damage, Violation

analysis of intentional versus negligent infliction of emotional distress, the district court
distinguished between the claims by renumbering them as "X(l)" and "X(2)."
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of Civil Rights or First Aid, happening during the period of this insurance except
as covered under Section II A and B.

(Id., Exh. A, at p. 13.)

35.

Under the Northfield Policy, ICRMP defends all claims that may involve the

Northfield Policy:

It is understood that all claims under this policy shall be serviced by I.C.R.M.P.'s
Claims Department who shall perform the following duties:
A. Investigate and settle or defend all claims or losses - it is understood that,
when so requested, the I.C.R.M.P. Claims Department will afford Underwriters
any opportunity to be associated with them in the defense or control of any claim,
suit or proceeding.

(Id., Exh. A, at p. 5.)
36.

Northfield's Policy does not impose on Northfield a duty to defend, but rather a

duty to reimburse defense costs for those costs incurred that are covered by the Northfield policy.

(Id., Exh. A.) As set forth in paragraph 34, supra, coverage under the Comprehensive General
Liability section provides for reimbursement of"Ultimate Net Loss" defined as:
17. ULTIMATE NET LOSS

For Section II, the term "ultimate net loss" shall mean the total sum which the
Assured becomes obligated to pay by reason of personal injury or property
damage claims, either through adjudication or compromise, after making proper
deductions for all recoveries and salvages.
"Ultimate net loss" shall also include hospital, medical and funeral charges and all
sums paid as salaries, wages, compensation, fees, expenses for doctors and nurses,
also law costs, premiums on attachment of appeal bonds, expenses for lawyers
and investigators and other persons for litigation, settlement, adjustment and
investigation of claims or suits which are paid as a consequence of any occurrence
covered hereunder.

(Id., Exh. A, at p. 40.)
3 7.

As defined under the General Definitions section, "occurrence" is:
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For Section II, "occurrence" means an accident or a happening or event or a
continuous or repeated exposure to conditions which result in personal injury or
damage to property during the policy period. All personal injuries to one or more
persons and/or property damage arising out of an accident or a happening or event
or a continuous or repeated exposure to conditions shall be deemed to be one
occurrence.
(Id., Exh. A, at p.6.)

38.

Intentional acts are excluded from Section II coverage:

THIS SECTION DOES NOT APPLY - to any Claim for damages, whether direct
or consequential, or for any cause of action which is covered under any other
Section of this policy or
A. to personal injury or property damage which the Assured intended or expected
or reasonably could have expected but this exclusion shall not apply to personal
injury resulting from the use of reasonable force to protect persons or property.

(Id., Exh. A, at p. 16.)

39.

Under Section II of the Northfield Policy, "Personal Injury" is defined to include:

Bodily Injury, Mental Anguish, Shock, Sickness, Disease, Disability,
Wrongful Eviction, Malicious Prosecution, Discrimination, Humiliation, Invasion
of Rights of Privacy, Libel, Slander or Defamation of Character; also Piracy and
any Infringement of Copyright or of Property, Erroneous Service of Civil Papers,
Assault and Battery, Disparagement of Property, False Arrest, False
Imprisonment and Detention.
(Id, Exh. A, at p. 14.)

40.

Section IV of the Northfield policy is a claims-made section which provides, in

relevant part that:
If during the Policy Period, any Claim is first made against the Assured for a

Wrongful Act, Underwriters will indemnify the Assured, for all Loss incurred by
the Assured by reason of any Wrongful Act as hereinafter defined.

C. The phrase "Claim first made" shall be understood to have happened when
l. the Assured or the service organization receive notice of suit or written
request for services or damages or
2. the Assured and the service organization receive knowledge of an incident
likely to give rise to a claim or
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3. the service organization establishes an incident file, whichever first occurs.
(Id, Exh. A, p. 21.)

41.

Section IV of the Northfield policy excludes coverage for "any Claim for

damages ... I. arising out oflaw enforcement activities[.]" (Id., Exh. A at p. 22.)
42.

Section IV of the Northfield Policy excludes coverage for damages "brought

about or contributed to by fraud, dishonesty or criminal act by any Assured[.]" (Id, Exh. A at p.
22.)
43.

The Specific Conditions section of Section IV provides:

1. LIMIT OF LIABILITY: Loss or losses arising out of the same Wrongful
Act or series of continuous, repeated or interrelated Wrongful Acts giving rise to a
claim or claims shall be construed as a single loss and only one self-insured
retention amount shall apply thereto.
and further excludes claims "resulting from an occurrence which commences prior to the
Retroactive Date set out in Declaration 4." (Id, Exh. A at pp. 22-23.)
44.

Under Endorsement No. 14, the following retroactive dates apply to Kootenai

County for Section IV purposes:
Kootenai County - November 29t\ 1985 for the first $ I ,000,000 any one claim,
December 31 st, 1994 for the next $1,000,000 any one claim and October l'\ 2000
for the remaining $4,000,000 any one claim.
(Id, Exh. A, Endorsement No. 14 (N00086).)

45.

Policies issued by Northfield to ICRMP for other policy years - including

AA1045, policy period approximately 1986-1988; AAI01127, policy period December 31, 1994
to December 31, 1997; AA101188, policy period January I, 1997 to October 1, 1998;
AA101188B, policy period approximately 1998-1998; AAI01226, policy period October I,
1998 to October 1, 1999; AA101242, policy period October I, 1999 to October 1, 2000 (as per
Endorsement No. 36); and AA101242a, policy period approximately 1999-2000 - include or
otherwise have the same coverage language as the 2000-2001 Northfield policy or reference
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standard language from a standard policy form identified as PE-OCC. JAN 94, which is the form
used by the 2000-2001 Northfield Policy. (Id., 115-12.)
46.

No "follow-form" language or provision is included in the Northfield Policy. (Id.,

Exh. A.)
47.

No "follow-the-fortunes" language or provision is included in the Northfield

Policy. (Id., Exh. A.)
48.

ICRMP sought reimbursement from Northfield for defense costs paid by it during

the defense of the Paradis action above ICRMP's self-insured retention. (R. 67-69.) Northfield
denied ICRMP's request for reimbursement on the basis that Northfield's policy no. AA101263
did not provide coverage for such costs or any sum paid by ICRMP to settle the Paradis civil
action against Kootenai County or the other defendants. (R. 71.)
II.

ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Northfield does not identify any additional issues on appeal.
III.

ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL

Northfield does not seek fees on appeal in this matter, but does request an award of costs
should it prevail, pursuant to l.A.R. 40.
IV.
A.

ARGUMENT

ICRMP's Decision To Defend The Kootenai County Defendants Under Its Own
Policy Does Not Trigger Coverage Under The Northfield Policy When No Coverage
For The Occurrence Exists Under the Northfield Policy.

ICRMP's first assignment of error is the assertion that the District Court failed to hold
that ICRMP could unilaterally decide whether or not coverage existed under the Northfield
policy, as ICRMP was defending the Paradis action. In doing so, ICRMP argues that Northfield
was barred from denying coverage under its own policy two years into the Paradis litigation.
This argument misconstrues the policies at issue.
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The District Court's decision, with respect to the reimbursement of defense costs, was
reached through a two step process. First, the District Court correctly held that there was no
occurrence during the Northfield policy (as discussed below). Second, the District Court held
that, because there was no coverage triggered due to the absence of an occurrence, defined by the
Northfield policy during its existence, Northfield did not have to "indemnify ... for all sums,
including expenses . . . which the Assured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages
imposed by law." (R. 20l)(emphasis in original). In turn, the District Court held, "[i]fthere is
no coverage, it follows that there can be no legal obligation to indemnify because there would be
no legal obligation to pay." (Id.)
ICRMP's argument, however, suggests that ICRMP had unilateral authority to elect to
defend under its own policy and bind Northfield to coverage under the Northfield policy.
However, a duty to defend arises not under the Northfield policy (which is a reimbursement
policy), but rather the ICRMP policy, a primary liability policy. (R. 219, Exh. 11, Counsel Aff.,
Exhibit I). ICRMP is an insurer, with its own policy, and its own duties ancillary to such policy.
See Exterovich v. City of Kellogg, 139 Idaho 439, 441, 80 P.3d 1040, 1042 (2003)("A liability

insurer such as ICRMP has two duties: the duty to defend, and the duty to indemnify."). No
actions or decisions taken by ICRMP relevant to its own policy issued to Kootenai County have
any bearing on questions of coverage under the Northfield policy.

ICRMP's assumption,

however, is that its initial determination of the duty to defend under its own policy extends out to
a determination of coverage under the Northfield policy, and suggests that Northfield should
have objected at the outset of the litigation as to coverage.
To the contrary, ICRMP's policy carries a $150,000 self-insured retention (SIR).
Moreover, until ICRMP advises Northfield that its SIR has been exhausted (which ICRMP did
not do until June 27, 2006, after it had already exceeded its SIR layer by $273,305.33 (R. 67-
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69.)), Northfield has no duty to reimburse, nor even any "duty to speak" with respect to its own
policy, a principle recognized in the analogous excess insurer context. See, e.g., All City Ins. Co.
v. Sioukas, 378 N.Y.S.2d 711 (N.Y. A.D. 1976)("And since it did not have a policy affording
coverage to the respondent until the primary coverage had been exhausted, it had no duty to
serve a notice of disclaimer upon the respondent or upon his highly experienced attorneys."); St.
Paul Fire Ins. Co. v. Children's Hosp. Nat'! Medical Center, 670 F. Supp. 393, 402 (D.D.C.
1987)("The issue here, however, is whether St. Paul had a duty to disclaim coverage or reserve
rights under the excess policies at the time it assumed the defense of the Lee claims under the
primary policy, or at some other time prior to judgment. We conclude that, prior to the time the
verdict was rendered, St. Paul had no such duty to speak with respect to the excess policies.");
Richmond, "Rights and Responsibilities of Excess Carriers," 78 Denver Univ. L.R. 29, 44-45
(2000) ("An excess carrier typically has no duty to defend its insured until the limits of
underlying coverage are exhausted ... the majority position also makes sense because an
insurer's duty to defend is expressly contractual, and if there is no policy language requiring an
insurer to defend, there can be no duty to do so.").

In fact, ICRMP's July 27, 2006

correspondence to Northfield even recognizes this: "To date, the defense costs incurred in the
Paradis litigation total $423,305.33.

Because the SIR has been exhausted, Northland's

obligation to reimburse ICRMP for defense costs exceeding the SIR has now arisen." (R.
67.)(emphasis added). Northfield denied the claim shortly thereafter, on July 20, 2006. 4 (R. 71).
B.

The Northfield Policy Is Not Reinsurance And Coverage-And Coverage Under It
Must First Exist For ICRMP To Be Entitled To Reimbursement.
As an alternative argument, ICRMP turns to the assertion that the Northfield policy is

reinsurance, for the proposition that a finding of coverage as a decision to defend under its own

4

Northfield had also pre-emptively denied coverage, prior to notice of the SIR exhaustion, on
February 13, 2006 (R. 55-58) and March 15, 2006 (R. 64-65).
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policy binds Northfield. 5 Importantly, however, reinsurance policies are typically identified by
the presence of "follow form" and/or "follow the fortune" provisions. 6 See, e.g., North River
Ins. Co. v. Cigna Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1199-1200 (3 rd Cir. 1995). In the present case,
however, the Northfield policy at issue lacks any follow-the-form or follow-the-fortune
provisions, as discussed herein.

Lacking these hallmarks, the Northfield policy cannot be

considered reinsurance, and instead is more correctly characterized as a "secondary assurance
policy," rather than 'reinsurance.' Northfield Ins. Co. v. Montana Ass'n of Counties, 10 P.3d
813, 814 (Mont. 2000)(analyzing a Northfield Public Entities All Lines Aggregate Insurance
Policy).
First, the Northfield policy does not have a follow-the-form provision. "A 'following
form' clause in a policy of reinsurance incorporates by reference all the terms and conditions of
the reinsured policy, except to the extent that the reinsurance contract by its own terms
specifically defines the scope of coverage differently, i.e., via an exclusion." Aetna Casualty and
Surety Company v. Home Ins. Co., 882 F. Supp. 1328, 1345 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); accord, North
River Ins. Co. v. Cigna Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1199 (3 rd 1995). As explained by the
Aetna court, the goal of a follow form is to achieve "concurrency of coverage" between the

5

The District Court declined to rule on whether or not the Northfield policy was reinsurance,
finding that Northfield did not specifically raise that issue in its summary judgment motion. (R.
201-202.)
6
For purposes of comparison, defendant refers this Court to the reinsurance issued by SCOR to
ICRMP, with coverage commencing October I, 2002. (R. 220, Exh. 11, Farley Aff., Exhibit
CC). Note that the SCOR policy lacks the COL-type language that is included in both the
ICRMP and Northfield policies. Compare id. with id., Exh. I & R. 220, Exh. 10, Martens Aff.,
Exh. A. Rather, the SCOR policy only agrees to "indemnify the Program, as set forth in the
Limits and Retention, Article 4, in respect of the liability which may attach to the Program under
all policies, bonds, binders, certificates, contracts of insurance or reinsurance, co-insurance or
co-indemnity, or other evidences of liability[.]" R. 220, Exh. 11, Counsel Aff., Exhibit CC, p. 1.
Moreover, the SCOR policy includes explicit 'following' language: "The liability of the
Reinsurers shall follow that of the Program in every case ... [t]he Reinsurers agree to abide by
the loss settlements of the Program, such settlements to be construed as satisfactory proof of
loss[.]" Id. at pp. 2, 8.
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original policy and the reinsurance policy:

Id. at 1345. In the present case, however, the

Northfield policy lacks any 'follow-the-form' language. (R. 220, Exh. 10, Martens Aff., Exh.
A.) Additionally, there is no mention of any ICRMP policy anywhere within the Northfield
policy. Id. To the contrary, similarities in comprehensive general liability and/or errors and
omissions language between the two policies only highlights Northfield's position: that its policy
is not reinsurance nor intended to be so, but rather is a stand-alone policy, utilizing standard
insurance policy terminology and structure.
Second, the Northfield policy does not have a follow-the-fortunes provision, nor can one
be imputed to the Northfield policy. Similar to follow-the-form terms are provisions knows as
"follow-the-fortunes", or "follow-the-settlement," provisions. These provisions will typically
incorporate language similar to: "All claims involving this reinsurance, when settled by
[Commercial Union], shall be binding on [Swiss Re), which shall be bound to pay its proportion
of such settlements promptly following receipt of proof of loss." Commercial Union Ins. Co. v.
Swiss Reinsurance America, 413 F.3d 121, 124 (1 st Cir. 2005). "Generally, when an insurer
loses - or settles - an underlying coverage dispute, 'follow the fortunes' makes the payment to
the insured binding on the reinsurer." North River Ins. Co, 52 F.3d at 1205. In the present case,
Northfield's policy lacks any follow-the-fortunes provision. Moreover, no follow-the fortunes
provision can be imputed to the Northfield policy. Michigan TP. Participating Plan v. Federal
Ins. Co., 592 N.W.2d 760, 764-65 (Mich. App. 1999)("[In Michigan Millers Mut. Ins. Co. v.
North American Reinsurance Coro., 452 N.W.2d 841 (Mich. App. 1990)], our Court pointed to
19 Couch, Insurance, 2d, § 80.66, pp. 673-674, to emphasize that '[t]he extent of the liability of

the reinsurer is determined by the language of the reinsurance contract, and the reinsurer
cannot be held liable beyond the terms of its contract merely because the original insurer has
sustained a loss."')(emphasis added). This is also consistent with Idaho law, which holds that
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"[w]here policy language is found to be unambiguous, the Court is to construe the policy as
written, 'and the Court by construction cannot create a liability not assumed by the insurer nor
make a new contract for the parties, or one different from that plainly intended, nor add words to
the contract of insurance to either create or avoid liability."' Purvis v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co.,
142 Idaho 213, _ , 127 P.3d 116, 119 (2005).
Importantly, although ICRMP contends that the policies are "similar" enough to argue
that the Northfield policy is reinsurance, it ignores the function and form of the policies. The
two policies are not the same, nor are they for the same purpose. ICRMP's first party liability
insurance issued to the County is for the direct benefit and protection of the County against
defense costs and potential liability of the County in civil cases so far is as relevant here.
Northland's policy does not provide first party liability coverage to the County. Northland's
policy insures ICRMP and is only called upon to reimburse or indemnify ICRMP if there is
coverage under the Northland policy's terms for a sum of money, including defense costs,
ICRMP was required to pay in excess of its self insured retention. The insuring language of both
policies, so far as is pertinent to the issues here, is set forth below:

ICRMP Policy Issued to
Kootenai County

Northland Policy Issued
to ICRMP

Section II - Comprehensive General Section II - Comprehensive General Liability.
Liability Insurance
Insuring Agreements.
Comprehensive
General
Liability
Insuring Agreements.
This section applies only to bodily injury,
personal injury or property damage which
Coverage A. Comprehensive General occurred during the policy period and arise out of
Liability. We agree, subject to the terms an occurrence which takes place within the
and conditions of this coverage, to pay on territorial scope of the policy.
your behalf those sums which you become
legally obligated to pay as damages for A - Comprehensive General Liability:
personal injury or property damage which
arise out of an occurrence during the policy Underwriters hereby agree, subject to the
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Northland Policy Issued
to ICRMP

ICRMP Policy Issued to
Kootenai County

period.
****
Coverage C.
Law Enforcement
Liability, We agree, subject to the terms

limitations, terms and conditions hereunder
mentioned, to indemnify the assured for all sums,
including expenses, all as more fully defined by
the term ultimate net loss, which the assured shall
become legally obligated to pay as damages
imposed by because of bodily injury, property
damage, personal injury, advertising injury,
products liability and/or completed operations,
host/liquor liability or incidental malpractice
which result from an occurrence and which occur
during the policy period.

and conditions of this coverage, to pay on
your behalf all sums which you become
legally obligated to pay by reason of errors,
omissions, or negligent acts arising out of
the performance of your duties while
providing law enforcement services or the
administration of first aid resulting in
personal injury or property damage during C - Law Enforcement Liability:
the policy period.
Underwriters hereby agree, subject to the
Definitions Applicable to Comprehensive limitations, terms and conditions hereunder
mentioned, to indemnify the assured for all sums
General Liability Insuring Agreements.
which the assured shall be obligated to pay by
1.
"Accident" means an unexpected reason of errors, omissions or negligent acts
arising out of the performance of the assured's
happening without intention or design.
duties while acting as a law enforcement official
8. "Occurrence" means an accident or a or officer in the regular course of public
continuous or repeated exposure to employment as hereinafter defined, arising
conditions which result in personal injury out of any occurrence from any cause on account
or property damage during the policy of personal injury, bodily injury, property
period. All personal injuries to one or damage, violation of civil rights or first aid,
more persons and/or property damage happening during the period of this insurance
arising out of an accident or a continuous except as covered under Sections II A and B.
or repeated exposure to conditions shall be
Notwithstanding insuring agreements A, B and C
deemed one occurrence.
above underwriter shall not be liable to indemnify
the assured for any sum which the assured shall
****
(R. 219, Exh. 2, McHenry Aff., Exh. l, p. be obligated to pay if a judgment or final
adjudication in any action brought against the
14.)
assured shall be based on a determination that
acts of fraud or dishonesty were committed by the
General Conditions.
assured.
Unless otherwise stated, the following
****
conditions are applicable to ALL sections
(R. 220, Exh. 9, Martens Aff., Exh. A, p. 13 of
of this policy.
43.)
9. Defense of Claims or Suit. We may

investigate or settle any claim or suit III. General Definitions.
against you, following review and The following words have specific meanings
consultation with you. We will provide a under various sections of the policy.
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ICRMP Policy Issued to
Kootenai County

defense with counsel of our choice, at our
expense, if you are sued for a covered
claim. Our obligation to defend any claim
or suit ends when the amount we pay
equals the limits of coverage afforded
under this policy, plus accrued costs of
defense.
(Id., Exh. 1, p. 2.)

Northland Policy Issued
to ICRMP

OCCURRENCE.
Section II, "occurrence" means an accident or a
happening or event or a continuous or repeated
exposure to conditions which result in personal
injury or damage to property during the policy
period. All personal injuries to one or more
persons and/or property damage arising from an
accident or happening or event or a continuous or
repeated exposure to conditions shall be deemed
to be one occurrence.
(Id., Martens Aff., Exh. A, p. 6 of 43.)

Clearly, there are significant differences in the two policies' coverage language.
ICRMP's policy insuring Kootenai County, like traditional first party liability insurance,
contains a duty to defend clause. The Northland policy does not. As can be easily seen, the
insuring language for comprehensive general liability coverage and law enforcement liability
coverage in the two policies is significantly different.
"occurrence" are different.

The two policies' definitions of

Law enforcement coverage under the Northland policy is

"occurrence" based as well, whereas no such language is contained in the ICRMP policy for such
coverage.

Consequently, whether ICRMP had a duty to defend Kootenai County and its

employees, either by its own analysis or a judicial declaration, is not in any way dispositive of
whether the facts and allegations in the Paradis suit arise from an "occurrence" covered by the
Northland policy. It is clear that under Idaho law, coverage under Northland's insurance policy
is to be determined by its clear, plain and unambiguous language or settled meaning, and not by
the language of the ICRMP policy insuring the County or whether ICRMP did or did not have a
duty to defend Kootenai County.
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Finally, ICRMP contends - with little explanation - that the Northfield policy should be
deemed to be ambiguous. ICRMP identifies a single instance in the Northfield policy where the
word "Reinsured" is used, in an introductory passage.

Appellant's Brief at 8.

From this,

plaintiff apparently asserts that an ambiguity has arisen, requiring the entire insurance contract to
be construed in ICRMP's favor, despite the fact that the Northfield policy has no follow-theform provision, and no follow-the-fortunes provision. This is a nonsensical reading of the
policy, and disregards Idaho law. See, e.g., Cascade Auto Glass, Inc. v. Idaho Farm Bureau Ins.
Co., 141 Idaho 660, 663, 115 P.3d 751, 754 (2005) ("In construing an insurance policy, the
Court must look to the plain meaning of the words to determine if there are any ambiguities.
This determination is a question of law. In resolving this question of law, the Court must
construe the policy "as a whole, not by an isolated phrase.") (emphasis added).
In fact, in examining coverage, the District Court expressly held that: "Here, the
Northfield policy is clearly an occurrence policy based on the unambiguous language and the
applicable policy provisions, considered in their entirety. No ambiguity exists in the policy
language and it is clear that only acts done while the policies were in effect were covered." (R.
197.) Thus, ICRMP has proposed an almost complete evisceration of the terms of the Northfield
policy, not even by focusing on a single isolated phrase, but rather on a single isolated word.
Such a result is patently absurd, and this Court should reject ICRMP's argument.
C.

ICRMP's Election to Defend Does Not Impact the District Court's Analysis of the
Existence of Coverage nnder the Northfield Policy. The District Court Properly
Analyzed Whether There Was An Occurrence During the Northfield Policy Period.

The second error asserted by ICRMP is that the District Court failed to apply the correct
legal standard for the duty to defend, in finding that there was no occurrence such as to trigger
coverage under the Northfield policy.
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Again, ICRMP attempts to blur the distinction between its own duty to defend (which it
could certainly undertake even on a voluntary basis), and Northfield's right to determine
coverage under its own policy. The decision of the District Court - as quoted by ICRMP- was
not an analysis of the duty to defend under the ICRMP policy, but rather whether or not an
'occurrence' arose such as to implicate coverage (to wit, reimbursement) under the Northfield
policy. (R. 195)(Heading: '"Occurrence' Under the Northfield Policy"). ICRMP may very well
believe that it had a duty to defend the Kootenai County insureds; however, Northfield contested
that, under its own policy, no 'occurrence' had triggered its reimbursement obligations. This is
the issue, in fact, that the District Court ruled on: "As such, the Court finds that no coverage
exists for ICRMP under the Northfield policy because there was no occurrence during the
policy period." (R. 200.) No discussion of the duty to defend is salient in analyzing coverage
under the Northfield policy, because the duty to defend does not relate to the reimbursement
coverage afforded by the Northfield policy. Thus, the District Court did not commit error in
failing to conduct a duty to defend analysis with respect to ICRMP's asserted obligations to its
own insureds, the Kootenai County defendants.
ICRMP also asserts that the District Court improperly made a factual finding, that "only
one proximate cause could exist for the wrongful imprisonment of Mr. Paradis and the
subsequent emotional distress he allegedly suffered." Appellant's Brief at 20. More correctly,
the District Court was applying the 'law governing the application of 'occurrence' over multipleyear claims and damages, given the allegations of the Paradis complaint.

This was not a

determination of a disputed fact, but a determination of the crux of the Paradis complaint to
determine the sourcewaters from which the claims and damages alleged by Mr. Paradis
originated. Indeed, ICRMP concedes that "the Paradis complaint alleged ongoing tortuous [sic]
activity which began when Paradis was initially arrested and continued for the next 20 years
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while he was incarcerated." Appellant's Brief at 21. The District Court correctly identified the
nature of the Paradis complaint (damages and claims accruing for 20 years arising from the
Kootenai County defendants Brady violation and subsequent arrest, trial and imprisonment):
In order for the Court to establish whether there was an occurrence within the
policy period, as such, the Court must first, identify the occurrence and then,
determine when it took place. Generally, an occurrence is determined by the
cause or causes of the tortious conduct. That is, the Court is to determine if there
was "but one proximate, uninterrupted, and continuing cause which resulted in all
of the injuries and damage." Appalachian Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 676
F.2d 56, 6 I (3 rd Cir. 1982)(citations omitted). In applying this test, the Court
finds that there was only one proximate cause for the wrongful imprisonment of
Mr. Paradis and the damages that resulted from it; the failure to make the Brady
disclosures and therefore, the failure to train properly regarding the Brady
disclosures. It was this failure that caused the errors that led to the wrongful
imprisonment in Idaho and the resulting infliction of emotional distress claims.
Had the Brady training occurred, the exculpatory evidence should have been
disclosed preventing the imprisonment of Mr. Paradis in Idaho and accordingly,
his emotional distress claims. For that reason, the Court views the occurrence as
being the failure to train regarding Brady requirements.
(R. 198.) In doing so, the Court relied on two key decisions: Kootenai County v. Western Cas.
& Sur. Co., 113 Idaho 908, 750 P.2d 87 (1988), and the Third Circuit decision cited therein,

Appalachian Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 676 F.2d 56 (3 rd Cir. 1982). Both stand for the
proposition that an event occurring prior to the commencement of coverage will not be covered
under a policy of liability insurance, irrespective of later damages and claims that may continue
to accrue.
In Western Cas., a county sheriff, acting upon a writ of execution, conducted an
execution sale of property. However, in doing so, the sheriff failed to act in accord with the
statutory notice periods, subjecting him to civil penalties payable to the aggrieved party.
Following the six month redemption period, the sheriff issued the deed to the subject property to
the purchasers, as required by statute. During the redemption period, however, Kootenai County
purchased an occurrence policy of liability insurance from Lloyd's and attempted to claim
coverage, asserting that the delivery of the deed, in conjunction with the earlier failure to notify
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in relation to the sale, constituted an occurrence under the policy. However, the Idaho Supreme
Court rejected this argument and found no coverage under the Lloyd's policy, noting that the key
wrongful act was the improperly conducted sale:
The improper execution sale is not an event covered by the Lloyd's policy since it
occurred almost six months prior to the effective date of the policy. An insurer is
not liable "for claims arising out of an event or accident which occurred prior to
the effective date of the insurance coverage, even though damages and claims
continued to accrue from this cause during the later period of coverage."
113 Idaho at 915 (quoting Appalachian Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Corp., 507 F. Supp. 59, 62
(W.D. Pa. 1981), affd 676 F.2d 56 (3 rd Cir. 1982))(emphasis added).
In Appalachian, an employer (Liberty Mutual) formulated certain job classifications in
1965, which ultimately gave rise to an EEOC complaint in 1971. Settlement was reached in the
amount of $5,500,000, and Liberty Mutual sought coverage from its insurer, Appalachian, which
had issued a policy for the policy year 1971. The Third Circuit refused to impose liability on
Appalachian, finding that "it is the cause of the loss, and not the resulting injury that determines
the incidents of liability under such policy."

507 F. Supp. at 62.

The Third Circuit also

summarized a critical point in analyzing what occurrence-based insurance is intended to provide
coverage for: "Basically, the 'claims made' policy would provide unlimited retroactive coverage
and no prospective coverage at all, while the 'occurrence' policy would provide unlimited
prospective coverage and no retroactive coverage at all." Id. at 61.
In applying these cases, the District Court correctly identified the initial occurrence - the
failure to train as to the Brady requirements, and related failure to make mandatory Brady
disclosures. This critical event is what gave rise to the Paradis litigation, and forms the lens
through which coverage under the Northfield policy must be analyzed.

The District Court

correctly analyzed the allegations at issue to identify this touchstone allegation, and its
application of Western Cas. and Appalachian thereto was not in error.
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D.

The Allegations in the Paradis Complaint Do Not Implicate Coverage Under the
Northfield Policy.
ICRMP next assigns error to the assertion that the District Court failed to find coverage

under the Northfield policy via extrapolation of the duty to defend under the ICRMP policy.
Plaintiff postures this as a two-prong argument: first, that the Court should have found ICRMP's
partial summary judgment as determinative of coverage under the Northfield policy; second, that
the specific allegations in the Paradis complaints implicated a duty to defend under the ICRMP
policy (and, in tum, coverage under the Northfield policy). As discussed above, the District
Court correctly held that there was no 'occurrence' under the Northfield policy (because the
occurrence arose prior to the inception of the Northfield policy period); in any event, no
coverage is implicated by the Paradis complaints, and ICRMP's two arguments fail.
As noted by ICRMP, the District Court did issue an initial order granting partial summary
judgment to the Kootenai County insured, stating that: "ICRMP was obligated, pursuant to the
policy of insurance it sold to Kootenai County, to provide a defense to its insureds for the lawsuit
filed by Donald Paradis[.]" (R. 187-88.) Of course, this order is absolutely silent as to the
Northfield policy at issue in the litigation. Recognizing this, ICRMP argues that the Northfield
insuring language then requires reimbursement of defense costs: "The policy requires Northfield
to indemnify its 'assured', ICRMP, for claims which ICRMP becomes 'legally obligated to pay'
because of bodily injury', or 'personal injury' caused by an occurrence which occurs during the
policy period."

Appellant's Brief at 22.

This argument ignores critical language in the

Northfield policy, which mandates analysis under the Northfield policy's own terms:
Section II - Comprehensive General Liability.
Insuring Agreements.
This section applies only to bodily injury, personal injury or property damage
which occurred during the policy period and arise out of an occurrence which
takes place within the territorial scope of the policy.
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A - Comprehensive General Liability:
Underwriters hereby agree, subject to the limitations, terms and conditions
hereunder mentioned, to indemnify the assured for all sums, including expenses,
all as more fully defined by the term ultimate net loss, which the assured shall
become legally obligated to pay as damages imposed by because of bodily injury,
property damage, personal injury, advertising injury, products liability and/or
completed operations, host/liquor liability or incidental malpractice which result
from an occurrence and which occur during the policy period.

C - Law Enforcement Liability:
Underwriters hereby agree, subject to the limitations, terms and conditions
hereunder mentioned, to indemnify the assured for all sums which the assured
shall be obligated to pay by reason of errors, omissions or negligent acts arising
out of the performance of the assured's duties while acting as a law enforcement
official or officer in the regular course of public employment as hereinafter
defined, arising out of any occurrence from any cause on account of personal
injury, bodily injury, property damage, violation of civil rights or first aid,
happening during the period of this insurance except as covered under
Sections II A and B.
(R. 220, Exh. 9, Martens Aff., Exhibit A (emphases added)).

Thus, coverage under the

Northfield policy must be examined upon its own terms, which are different than ICRMP's. For
example, with respect to the definition of "occurrence" under Section II coverage, the ICRMP
policy provides, in relevant part, that:
All personal injuries to one or more persons and/or property damage arising out of
an accident or a continuous or repeated exposure to conditions shall be
deemed one occurrence.
(R. 220, Exh. 11, Counsel Aff., Exh. I, at p. 14 (emphasis added).) The Northfield "single
occurrence" provision, however, incorporates more than just "accidents" and "continuous or
repeated exposure to conditions":
All personal injuries to one or more persons and/or property damage arising out of
an accident or a happening or event or a continuous or repeated exposure to
conditions shall be deemed to be one occurrence.
(R. 220, Exh. 9, Martens Aff., Exh. A, at p. 6 (emphasis added)). Thus, the Northfield policy
would cut a broader swath in consolidating claims arising from a common nucleus (be it
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accident, happening, event, or exposure to conditions) that would then be reduced to a single
occurrence - coverage for which must occur within the policy period. As discussed above, the
District Court correctly held that there was no 'occurrence' under the Northfield policy.
Turning to the other prong of ICRMP's argument, a count-by-count recap of the various
claims in the initial complaint and amended complaint in Paradis - and application of the
Northfield policy - is warranted.
Based on ICRMP's own analysis of its own policy with respect to the initial Paradis
Complaint (R. 220, Exh. 11, Counsel Aff, Exh. E), ICRMP provided a defense to all of the
defendants (except Dr. Brady, who was not employed by Kootenai County).

However, the

claims are not covered by the Northfield policy:
•

Counts One and Two against Kootenai County and Walker are not covered, as
they are civil rights claims wherein the alleged wrongful acts - failure to train resulted in Mr. Paradis' incarceration in 1981, almost twenty years prior to the
commencement of coverage under the Northfield policy. See, e.g., Western Cas.,
113 Idaho at 915; North River Ins. Co., 428 F. Supp. 2d at 1288-92. Additionally,
Count II explicitly only alleges acts in 1980 and 1981.
Counts Four, Five, and Six against all defendants for "negligence, false arrest,
malicious prosecution, and false imprisonment" are not covered, as the claims
allege either intentional acts, or simply reiterate Walker's alleged negligent failure
to train (as also per Counts One and Two). With respect to the claim of
negligence against Walker, that claim is not covered for the same reasons as
Counts One and Two (see ,88, incorporating the allegations of Counts One and
Two). With respect to the other claims, these allegations claim acts that allegedly
occurred during or before the trial of Mr. Paradis, who was convicted in
December 1981, predating Northfield's coverage period. Additionally, all of the
acts alleged are intentional in nature, which would be excluded from coverage by
Exclusion A of Section II ("personal injury or property damage which the Assured
intended or expected or reasonably could have expected" where 'personal injury'
explicitly includes "Malicious Prosecution . . . False Arrest, [and] False
Imprisonment"). (R. 220, Exh. 9, Martens Aff., Exh. A, pp. 14 & 16. 7)

7

Moreover, as later noted by the Paradis court, Idaho has a general rule precluding state law civil
claims for perjury or falsification of evidence. Counsel Aff., Exh. F, at p. 65 (citing Anderton v.
Herrington, 741 P.2d 360 (Ct. App. 1987)).
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Count Six against defendants Haws, Elliott, Walker and Erbland is not covered by
the Northfield Policy, as the acts complained of predate December 1981 and also
allege intentional acts. Paradis' complaint alleged a conspiracy to "concoct
evidence against Paradis and present it as if fact" (,J90). These claims both only
refer to acts prior to and during trial (again, Mr. Paradis was convicted on
December 10, 1981 ), and refers strictly to the intentional acts of Haws, Walker,
Elliott, and Erbland, which claims would be from coverage by Exclusion A of
Section II ("personal injury or property damage which the Assured intended or
expected or reasonably could have expected"). (R. 220, Exh. 9, Martens Aff.,
Exh. A, p. 16.)
•

Counts Seven and Eight against Dr. Brady are not covered, as ICRMP did not
defend Dr. Brady, so no claim of reimbursement arises.

•

Counts Nine, Ten, and Eleven against Haws are not covered, as the claims allege
negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress pre-dating Paradis'
conviction or which continued thereafter. Again, the "occurrence" or event was
the failure to disclose by Haws prior to conviction in 1981 and, consequently, any
continuation of that event is the same prior occurrence, and defamation. These
claims are excluded from Section II coverage, by Exclusion A of Section II
("personal injury or property damage which the Assured intended or expected or
reasonably could have expected", where 'personal injury' is stated to include
"Mental Anguish" and "Defamation of Character"). (R. 220, Exh. 9, Martens
Aff., Exh. A, pp. 14 & 16.) Moreover, Haws left the employment of Kootenai
County in 1983, and acts alleged after that date would not have occurred while
acting as an employee of the county. (R. 220, Exh. 11, Counsel Aff., Exh. DD, at
II. 121:5-7; Counsel Aff., Exh. E, i!l13.)

Thus, for defense costs incurred by ICRMP prior to Paradis' First Amended Complaint (June 6,
2005) Northfield has no obligation to reimburse such costs under Section II of the Northfield
Comprehensive General Liability coverage.
Following the initial order of the Paradis court dismissing some claims, Mr. Paradis filed his
First Amended Complaint (R. 220, Exh. 11, Counsel Aff., Exh. D), which ICRMP provided a
defense for (with the exception of Dr. Brady). Again, however, the claims posed are not covered
by the Northfield policy:
•

Counts I. II, and III against Walker and Kootenai County are not covered, as they
are §1983 claims (discussed above) wherein the alleged wrongful acts - failure to
train - resulted in Mr. Paradis' incarceration in I 981, almost twenty years prior to
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the commencement of coverage under the Northfield policy. 8 See, e.g., Western
Cas., 113 Idaho at 915; North River Ins. Co., 428 F. Supp. 2d at 1288-92.
Additionally, Counts II and III explicitly only allege acts in 1980 and 1981 (pp.
20-25); even ICRMP did not consider these claims covered. (R. 220, Exh. 11,
Counsel Aff., Exh. R.)

•

Count IV against Elliott is not covered, as it, too, is an uncovered § 1983 claim
relating to Mr. Paradis' 1981 conviction. Further, with a malicious prosecution
claim, coverage under an insurance policy is instead triggered when damage
begins to accrue - that is, with malicious prosecution, almost immediately. See
Muller Fuel Oil Co. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 232 A.2d 168, 175 (NJ.
Super. l 967)("1n a claim based on malicious prosecution the damage begins to
flow from the very commencement of the tortious conduct-the making of the
criminal complaint"). Muller has been favorably cited in Idaho. See National
Aviation Underwriters, Inc. v. Idaho Aviation Center, 96 Idaho 663, 670, 471
P.2d 55, 57 (1970) ("It is well settled that the time of the occurrence of an
'accident,' within the meaning of a liability indemnity policy, is not the time the
wrongful act was committed but the time the complaining party was actually
damaged."). Finally, the allegations discuss intentional acts by Elliott, which
would be excluded from coverage by Exclusion A of Section II ("personal injury
or property damage which the Assured intended or expected or reasonably could
have expected" where 'personal injury' explicitly includes "Malicious
Prosecution"). (R. 220, Exh. 9, Martens Aff., Exh. A, pp. 14 & 16.) Again,
Kootenai County did not consider this claim covered. (R. 220, Exh. 11, Counsel
Aff., Exh. R.)

•

Count V against all of the defendants is not covered, as the First Amended
Complaint references that the wrongful act under § 1983 - the conspiracy occurred "pre-arrest," which would have occurred in 1980 (November 26, 1980 if59), well outside of the coverage provisions. Further, as a conspiracy to which
intent was alleged (pp. 27-29), the intentional act exclusion would also apply. (R.
220, Exh. 9, Martens Aff., Exh. A, pp. 14 & 16.) Kootenai County did not
consider this claim covered. (R. 220, Exh. 11, Counsel Aff., Exh. R. 9)

•

Count VI against Elliott is not covered, as it is a § 1983 claim for fraudulent
procurement of an arrest warrant, alleging acts prior to and during Mr. Paradis'
preliminary hearing (December 1980) and the motion to dismiss on jurisdictional
grounds (April 1981). (if66.) As such, these claims did not "occur" within the
Northfield policy's coverage period. Additionally, as framed in the Paradis First
Amended Complaint, the acts complained of are intentional in nature, such that

8

Additionally, Mr. Walker left office as Prosecuting Attorney in 1988. (R. 220, Exh. 11,
Counsel Aff., Exh. EE, at 11. 56:5-24.)
9 Haws left the employment of Kootenai County in 1983 (R. 220, Exh. 11, Counsel Aff, Exh.
DD, at IL 121:5-7); Erbland left the employment of Kootenai County in 1987 (Id., Exh. FF, at ll.
10:6-8); and Elliott retired in 1988 (Id., Exh. GG, at IL 8:8-13).
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the intentional act exclusion applies to bar coverage. (R. 220, Exh. 9, Martens
Kootenai County did not consider this claim
Aff., Exh. A, pp. 14 & 16.)
covered. (R. 220, Exh. 11, Counsel Aff., Exh. R.)
•

Count VII against defendants Kootenai County and Walker simply incorporates
Counts I, II, and III, and restates them as a state claim for failure to
train/supervise. (ififl52-159.) For the same reasons that bar coverage for Counts
I, II, and III, coverage is also barred here, as any damage to Paradis arising from
the failure to train/supervise commenced at least at the time of the probable cause
hearing (June 25, 1980), and, at latest, at the time of his conviction (December 10,
1981). Kootenai County did not consider this claim covered. (R. 220, Exh. 11,
Counsel Aff., Exh. R.)

•

Count VIII against Brady was not defended by the County. (R. 220, Exh. 9,
Martens Aff., Exh. C & Exh. 11, Counsel Aff., Exh. R.)

•

Count IX against Haws and Brady is not covered, as Brady was not defended by
the County. (R. 220, Exh. 11, Counsel Aff., Exh. R.) With respect to defendant
Haws, Paradis alleged that "[o]n diverse occasions after the conviction of
Plaintiff-Paradis, up to and including the time of his release upon habeas corpus,
Defendant-Haws and Brady made statements about Plaintiff-Paradis that placed
him in a false light," and that "[t]hese statements by Haws took place on or about
1986 and 1987 and continued after Plaintiff-Paradis' release from prison." (,r,r171
& 174.) The Northfield policy excludes coverage for personal injury damages
that are intended or reasonably expected, where personal injury is defined, in
relevant part, to include "Invasion of Rights of Privacy, Libel, Slander or
Defamation of Character," which would preclude coverage for this claim under
the Northfield policy. (R. 220, Exh. 9, Martens Aff., Exh. A, pp. 14 & 16.)
However, Mr. Haws left the employment of Kootenai County in 1983; ICRMP
did not deem this claim covered for that reason. (R. 220, Exh. 11, Counsel Aff.,
Exh. R & DD, at 11. 121:5-7.)

•

Count X against defendant Haws is not covered, for the reasons previously
discussed; to wit, the § 1983 claim was triggered for insurance purposes at the
time the event giving rise to the harm occurred. Western Cas., 113 Idaho at 915.
Additionally, the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is precluded
from coverage by the intentional acts exclusion. (R. 220, Exh. 9, Martens Aff.,
Exh. A, p. 14 & 16.) Further, Haws left the employment of Kootenai County in
1983. (R. 220, Exh. 11, Counsel Aff., Exh. DD, at 11. 121:5-7.)

•

Count XI against defendants Elliott and Brady is not covered, as Brady was not
defended by the County. (R. 220, Exh. 9, Martens Aff., Exh. C & Exh. 11,
Counsel Aff., Exh. R.) Further, with respect to Elliott, Paradis' §1983 claim
alleged that "Brady and Elliott conspired that Brady would not bring documents
and tangible evidence to, or reveal documents and tangible evidence at, the trial of
Plaintiff-Paradis, that would show that he was innocent of the crime with which
he was charged." (1200.) Thus, the conspiracy alleged would predate Paradis'
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conviction of December 10, 1981, thereby falling outside the coverage provided
by the Northfield policy. Also, like Count V, as framed in the Paradis First
Amended Complaint, the acts complained of are intentional in nature, such that
the intentional act exclusion applies to bar coverage. (R. 220, Exh. 9, Martens
Aff., Exh. A, pp. 14 & 16.) Kootenai County did not consider this claim covered.
(R. 220, Exh. 11, Counsel Aff., Exh. R.)
Thus, for defense costs related to the Amended Complaint, Northfield has no obligation to
reimburse such costs under Section II of the Northfield policy.
ICRMP specifically highlights two arguments in favor of coverage: first, that some torts
were independent, and second, that some were continuing. Although Northland addresses each
count above, it also addresses this particular arguments for the sake of completeness.
With respect to the argument for "independent" torts, ICRMP specifically cites to the
allegations against Haws, and the allegation that "Haws made a series of false statements
concerning him which began in 1986 and 1987 and continued until his release from prison."
Appellant's Brief at 27. Even assuming arguendo that these acts are not claims arising from an
original event and thereby not covered (as held by the District Court), 10 ICRMP ignores the fact
that Mr. Haws left the employment of Kootenai County in 1983, obviously long prior to the
issuance of the Northfield policy at issue, and even prior to the formation of ICRMP itself. R.
220, Exh. 11, Counsel Aff., Exh. DD, at II. 121:5-7. Thus, if "independent torts", Mr. Haws
would have done so when he was not an employee of Kootenai County, and thus, would not be
an "Assured" under the Northfield Policy:

It is agreed that the unqualified word 'Assured' wherever used in this Insurance
includes not only the Named Assured but also:
A. any official, trustee, Director, Officer, Partner, Volunteer or employee of the
Named Assured while acting within the scope of his duties as such, and any

10

The District Court recognized that "ICRMP found that a duty to defend resulted only on three
of the surviving claims, Count I (§ 1983: Failure to Train re: Brady) against Kootenai County;
Count X(l) (Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress) against Haws; and Count X(2)
(Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress) against Haws" (R.192.)
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person, organization, trustee or estate to whom the Named Assured is obligated by
virtue of written contract or agreement to provide insurance such as is offered by
this Insurance, but only in respect of operations by or on behalf of the Named
Insured.
(R. 220, Exhibit 9, Martens Aff., Exh. A, p.5.) Thus, ICRMP's argument on this point fails.
ICRMP alternatively argues that some of the torts alleged are continuing in nature, and thus
implicate the 2000-200 l Northfield policy year.

Setting aside the fact that a number of the

identified claims were even disavowed by ICRMP as covered (R. 220, Exhibit 11, Counsel Aff.,
Exh. R), ICRMP's proposed continuing tort analysis does not comport with insurance law nor
the facts of this case.

Plaintiff first relies on Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North America,

667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981), wherein the court discussed the difficulty in identifying a trigger
date in analyzing insurance coverage:
The language of each policy at issue in this case clearly provides that an "injury,"
and not the "occurrence" that causes the injury, must fall within a policy period
for it to be covered by the policy. Most suits brought under this type of policy
involve an injury and an occurrence that transpired simultaneously, or, at least, in
close temporal proximity to one another. In cases involving asbestos-related
disease, however, inhalation-the "occurrence" that causes the injury-takes
place substantially before the manifestation of the ultimate injury-asbestosis,
mesothelioma, or lung cancer. Furthermore, although it is not known how little
exposure is required to cause disease, inhalation may occur over a long period of
time. As a result, inhalation may continue through numerous policy periods, the
disease may develop during subsequent policy periods, and manifestation may
occur in yet another policy period. For an insured such as Keene, different
insurers are likely to be on the risk at different points in the development of each
plaintiff's disease. Moreover, part of the development may occur at a time when
no insurer was on the risk. Asbestos-related diseases, which are certainly
covered by the policies, therefore differ from most injuries and hence present
a difficult problem of contractual interpretation.
667 F .2d at 1040 (emphases added). In the present case, no ambiguity in the key event exists;
rather, the Kootenai County defendants failed to train on, and make, Brady disclosures, and Mr.
Paradis was convicted in 1981 and subsequently imprisoned. Thus, Keene offers ICRMP no
assistance.
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ICRMP also relies upon Nat'! Cas. Ins. Co. v. City of Mt. Vernon, 515 N.Y.S.2d 267
( 1987) with respect to a false imprisonment claim, 11 but disregards a key passage of the cited
quote: "We note, however, that there is nothing in the policy which requires, as a prerequisite to
ascertain whether there is coverage, that the injury resulting from a causative event be reduced to
a single or fixed occurrence in time." Id. at 270. The Northfield policy, however, provides:
For Section II, "occurrence" means an accident or a happening or event or a
continuous or repeated exposure to conditions which result in personal injury or
damage to property during the policy period. All personal injuries to one or more
persons and/or property damage arising out of an accident or a happening or event
or a continuous or repeated exposure to conditions shall be deemed to be one
occurrence.
(R. 220, Exh. 9, Martens Aff., Exh. A, p.6.) In a more recent decision to the contrary, the

Southern District of Florida refused to find coverage for false imprisonment-type claims that
arose 20 years prior to the inception of coverage under a policy where a claim was made simply
based upon the exoneration date, as in the present case:

It is undisputed that Messrs. Smith and Townsend were neither arrested nor
incarcerated during the policy period. The question before the Court is whether
the claims alleged in the Underlying Complaints occurred during the policy
period. The defendants argue that the ongoing nature of the injuries to Messrs.
Smith and Townsend, coupled with the fact that they were actually exonerated
during the period of coverage triggers Plaintiff's duty to defend against the
Underlying Complaints.
North River Ins. Co. v. Broward County Sheriff's Office, 428 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1288-89 (S.D.
Fla. 2006). The court rejected this contention:
In this case, it is clear that the damage "occurred" and manifested itself well
before the Policy period. Years before the Policy was a glimmer in the
Defendants' collective eye, Messrs. Lee and Townsend were allegedly wrongfully
deprived of their liberty and falsely imprisoned - and any alleged malicious
prosecution resulted in their imprisonment at that time. Not only would it strain
logic to hold that a policy could be applied retroactively to activities undertaken

11

Paradis only alleged false imprisonment in his initial Complaint (as discussed above), and
false imprisonment was not one of the three counts of the Amended Complaint that ICRMP
believed it provided coverage for. (R. 220, Exh. 11, Counsel Aff., Exh. R).
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twenty years earlier, but as a matter of public policy, if this Court were to deny
Plaintiffs motion, it would be imposing on Plaintiff a risk based on the fortuitous
occasion of the date of exoneration as opposed to when the date when the damage
first manifests itself, i.e. the date of incarceration. While North River has a duty
to defend lawsuits against officers for malicious prosecution or false
imprisonment claims occurring during the Policy period, it is inconceivable that
the calculation of the premium that Broward County paid North River to purchase
the Policy including an analysis of any earlier prosecutions in Broward County
and the likelihood of malfeasance over the course of those prosecutions.

Id at 1290 (emphasis in original; underlined emphasis supplied by defendant). After referencing
Heck, the court went on to state:
For the reasons stated above, the Court does not consider holding the trigger
for the claims for which the Defendants seek coverage to be outside the policy
period inconsistent with the Court's view that a constitutional claim that
undermines a criminal conviction cannot be brought until the defendant's
conviction is nullified.
If, in this case, the Defendants were asserting coverage of constitutional
claims (which they are not), those claims would be outside the policy period as
well - although the statute of limitations on those claims may not have begun to
run until Messrs. Lee and Townsend were in fact exonerated.

Thus, consistent with Florida law, the Court finds that the "bodily injury" and
"personal injury" covered by Defendants' insurance from 1999 through 2002
cannot be invoked to cover allegations of malicious prosecution, false
imprisonment and numerous allegations of negligence and civil rights violations
that "occurred" twenty years earlier.

Id at 1290 n.3 & 1292. Accordingly, the consummation of any alleged failure to provide Brady
training- and the resultant damage, the commencement of Mr. Paradis' incarceration - occurred,
at latest, in December 198 I, which would thereby not be covered as an "occurrence" under the
2000-2001 or any earlier Northfield policy period, and the fact of exoneration during the 2000200 I Northfield policy period does not result in coverage by Northfield. Reliance upon the April

IO, 200 I date of Paradis' release fails, as there is a sharp distinction between claim accrual in the
statute oflimitations sense, and occurrence in the insurance sense:
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But these dates need not necessarily correspond. Reliance on the
commencement of the statute of limitation is not dispositive in determining when
a tort occurs for insurance purposes. Statutes of limitation and triggering dates for
insurance purposes serve distinct functions and reflect different policy concerns.
Statutes of limitation function to expedite litigation and discourage stale claims.
Bigansky v. Thomas Jefferson University Hosp., 442 Pa.Super. 69, 658 A.2d 423,
426 (1995). But when determining when a tort occurs for insurance purposes,
courts have generally sought to protect the reasonable expectations of the parties
to the insurance contract. Appalachian Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 676 F.2d
56 (3d Cir.1982).
Because of this fundamental difference in purpose, courts have consistently
rejected the idea they are bound by the statutes of limitation when seeking to
determine when a tort occurs for insurance purposes. See ACandS, Inc. v. Aetna
Cas. and Sur. Co., 764 F.2d 968, 972 (3d Cir.1985) (statute of limitation cases
"are not particularly relevant" to determining what event triggers insurance
coverage); Keene Corp. v. Ins. Co. of North America, 667 F.2d 1034, 1043-44
(D.C.Cir.1981) (statute of limitation cases "are not at all relevant" and "have no
bearing" in case seeking to determine when tort occurred for insurance purposes);
Insurance Co. of North America v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212,
1220 (6th Cir.1980) (because of differences in underlying policies, statute of
limitation cases not relevant to determining when asbestos-related tort occurs for
insurance purposes); Commercial Union Assurance Co. v. Zurich American Ins.
Co., 471 F.Supp. 1011, 1015 (S.D.Ala.1979) ("cases dealing with the
determination of the date or occurrence of a continuing injury or disease for the
purpose of applying appropriate statute of limitations are not controlling for
purposes of determining insurance coverage"); Southern Maryland Agric. Ass'n v.
Bituminous Cas. Corp., 539 F.Supp. 1295, 1302-03 (D.Md.1982) (date on which
statute of limitation begins to run not determinative of date when tort of malicious
prosecution occurs); S. Freedman & Sons v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 396 A.2d 195,
198-99 (D.C.1978) (statute of limitation "provides little assistance" and "need not
determine" when tort of malicious prosecution occurs).
City of Erie, Pennsylvania v. Guaranty Nat. Ins. Co., 109 F.2d 156,161-62 (3 rd Cir. 1997). Thus,
a continuing tort analysis, which may identify a later date for statute of limitations purposes,
does not dictate the determination of "occurrence" in the insurance context.
Finally, ICRMP curiously relies upon Dioceses of Winona v. Interstate Fire & Casualty
Co., 89 F .3d 1386 (8 th Cir. 1996). While the facts of Dioceses is inapposite to the present matter
(ongoing sexual abuse), application of Dioceses, in an event, would result in Northfield avoiding
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coverage for the Paradis claims. 12 In Dioceses, the Eighth Circuit applied Minnesota law to find
that the repeated sexual abuse of a child constituted "one continuing occurrence." Id. at 1391. In
doing so, the court held that multiple insurers could be held responsible for policies covering
certain portions of time during the 1979-1987 span of the abuse. Id. at 1395-96. In doing so, the
Eighth Circuit went on to note:
The parties agree that Mrozka's abuse began in October 1979 and continued until
February 1987. Thus, it is undisputed that Mrozka suffered "actual injury" in all
policy periods, tri~Fering the coverage of all such policy periods. See NSP, 523
N.W.2d at 663.FN We have determined, however, that there was no covered
"occurrence" for purposes of insurance coverage for the Archdiocese after
December 1980, thus, the only insurance coverage triggered are those in effect
from October 1979 through December 1980: Aetna's through August 30, 1980,
and Lloyd's and Interstate's commencing September 1, 1980.
FNl 1. Furthermore, as we discussed in footnote 5, supra, the court in NSP also
held that in situations in which multiple policies involved where there was one
continuous occurrence, the courts should apply one full SIR or limit to each
separate policy period. 523 N. W.2d at 664. Thus, under the rationale set forth in
NSP, the Archdiocese must assume the retained limit with respect to each of the
triggered policies.

12

Although plaintiff asserts that "[o]nce a policy is triggered, the insurers are jointly and several
liable for the overall risk" (Appellant's Brief at n.3), Dioceses expressly stands for a contrary
position - insurer liability based upon time "on the risk" - the application of which would avoid
any potential collision between an insurer's need to sue other insurers to recover on a joint and
several liability, and Idaho's general prohibition of third-party direct actions against insurers,
even as between insurers. See, e.g., Stonewall Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Co. of
Idaho, 132 Idaho 318, 322 & n.2, 971 P.2d 1142, 1146 (l998)(refusing insurer-v-insurer direct
action in third party claim, and also distinguishing Empire Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. North
Pacific Ins. Co., 127 Idaho 716, 95 P.2d 1025 (1995) as involving first-party coverage and
remarking that direct action issue not raised, suggesting disapproval of even first-party coveragerelated insurer-v-insurer direct actions). Note that beginning in June of 2003 until immediately
prior to this litigation, ICRMP has sought reimbursement from multiple insurers for the Paradis
claim. (R. 220, Exh. 11, Counsel Aff., Exhs. S-BB.)
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E.

Northland Has the Right to Contest Coverage of ICRMP's Settlement with
Mr. Paradis.
In the final section of ICRMP's brief, ICRMP relies upon City of Idaho Falls v. Home

Indemnity Co., 126 Idaho 604, 888 P.2d 383 (1995) for the proposition that Northland "cannot
relitigate or challenge the settlement which was reached between ICRMP and Mr. Paradis."
Appellant's Brief at 36. However, the day prior to the filing of appellant's brief, this
Court further clarified the City of Idaho Falls decision on this particular point. See Deluna v.
State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 2008 WL 2586497 (Idaho, July I, 2008).
In the Deluna matter, the insured was sued by a party (Ms. Deluna) claiming, among
other causes of action, negligent transmission of herpes and negligent infliction of emotional
distress. Id. at *I. The insured had tendered defense of the matter to State Farm, who refused to
defend; the insured proceeded to defend the matter pro se. Id. at *2. The underlying matter
proceeded to trial, where Ms. Deluna prevailed on the two aforementioned negligence claims,
recovering a judgment of$ I ,282,596.32. Id. However, the insured had previously assigned his
rights to indemnity under the State Farm policy, in return for a promise that Ms. Deluna would
not recover against him. Id. Thus, the insured did not even appear for the trial of the matter. Id.
Ms. Deluna subsequently sued State Farm to recover on the judgment, and asserted, in
part, that State Farm could not challenge coverage of the judgment under its policy, given that it
had previously refused to defend. Id. In doing so, Ms. Deluna relied upon the City of Idaho
Falls decision - as ICRMP does here - to argue that State Farm was now estopped from
challenging the verdict or otherwise disputing its duty to indemnify. Id. at *4. This Court
rejected that argument:

Hirst concluded the duty to indemnify is triggered only where an insurance
company would be obligated to pay the underlying action regardless of how it
fulfilled its duty to defend. We agree.
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Deluna argues that an insurer, having breached its duty to defend, is not
entitled to relitigate an underlying action following a settlement or judgment,
citing the City of Idaho Falls case. 126 Idaho at 610, 888 P.2d at 389. However,
in Hirst, the Court of Appeals correctly stated: "[W]here an insurance company
has wrongfully refused to defend, it may nevertheless in a subsequent action on
the policy attempt to show that the liability is not covered by the policy." 106
Idaho at 799, 683 P.2d at 447 (quoting Afcan v. Mutual Fire, Marine and Inland
Ins. Co., 595 P.2d 638, 647 (1979)). In Afcan, the Alaska Supreme Court was
considering a situation where liability was imposed by a settlement agreement
involving claims that fell both within and outside of the policy. The Court
explained that an insurer would be liable up to policy limits if the claims fell
within policy coverage, but would not be liable if the claims were outside policy
coverage. Afcan, 895 P.2d at 647. In this case, State Farm is not attempting to
relitigate the judgment in Deluna v. Kramsky. Instead, it attempts only to show
that Deluna's claims fell outside Kramsky's business insurance policy and it is
entitled to do so.

Id. In doing so, this Court reiterated its rejection of the so-called "Illinois Rule", wherein an
insurer is estopped from denying coverage if it breaches its duty to defend. Id. Thus, ICRMP
cannot find refuge in estoppel principles, and Northfield is entitled to challenge whether its
policy affords coverage for the Paradis action; both the cost of defense incurred by ICRMP and
that there is no coverage for the amount paid in settlement by ICRMP.
The central, if not the only, issue in this case is whether there is coverage under the
Northfield policy and, more specifically, whether any of the underlying allegations and facts in
the Paradis case constitute an occurrence, happening or event, which occurred during the period
of the Northfield policy. Northfield clearly demonstrated, and the district court found, there was
no occurrence and, therefore, no coverage of the sums ICRMP paid. Under the Northfield
policy, no coverage means no obligation to reimburse for either defense costs or the amount paid
in settlement. ICRMP's argument that Northfield must reimburse the amount of the settlement
completely misses the point, under Idaho law as well as the language of the Northfield policy.
Northfield did not breach a duty to defend because there is not duty to defend under the
Northfield policy. Northfield did not breach its insurance contract with ICRMP and has no
liability to ICRMP at all.
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V.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, the decision of the District Court granting
summary judgment to Northfield should be affirmed.
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